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Abstract
Objectives
This paper introduces a framework with which to conceptualise the decision-making process
in health technology assessment for new interventions with high budgetary impacts. In such
circumstances, the use of a single threshold based on the marginal productivity of the health
care system is inappropriate. The implications of this for potential partial implementation,
horizontal equity and pharmaceutical pricing are illustrated using this framework.
Results
Under the condition of perfect divisibility and given an objective of maximising health, a large
budgetary impact of a new treatment may imply that optimal implementation is partial rather
than full, even at a given incremental cost-effectiveness ratio that would nevertheless mean the
decision to accept the treatment in full would not lead to a net reduction in health. In a one-shot
price-setting game, this seems to give rise to potential horizontal equity concerns. When the
assumption of fixity of the ICER (arising from the assumed exogeneity of the manufacturer’s
price) is relaxed, it can be shown that the threat of partial implementation may be sufficient to
give rise to an ICER at which cost the entire potential population is treated, maximising health
at an increased level, and with no contravention of the horizontal equity principle.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness, equity, pharmaceutical price regulation.
∗Corresponding author: email d.howdon@leeds.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
New and expensive health technologies with large eligible patient populations can impose signifi-
cant budget impacts on healthcare systems1. A prominent recent example of new pharmacological
treatments for hepatitis C caused issues for health technology assessment agencies around the
world2. In England, where the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
has historically emphasised the importance of cost-effectiveness as opposed to budget impact,
approval by NICE for these drugs caused NHS England to break from routine by requiring
a delay on implementation of the NICE guidance on account of the large projected budget
impact3. NICE has since introduced a “budget impact test” that will result in high budget
impact technologies being “slow tracked” to allow for further negotiations between NHS England
and the manufacturer4. Critics have argued that this is a “flawed attempt” to solve the problem
and is not rooted within NICE’s existing opportunity cost framework5. Australia’s Pharmaceu-
tical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) adopted a different approach when evaluating new
hepatitis C drugs by using a lower cost per QALY ‘threshold’, justified with reference to the
large expected budget impact2. Further writing on the topic has suggested that experiences
with technologies such as these require more emphasis to be placed on affordability6–8.
Conventional decision-making for health technology assessment relies upon accepting or
rejecting, in full, new interventions based upon their incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
compared to some benchmark threshold, λ9a. The assumption of a constant threshold may
be unproblematic in the case of decision-making which does not use up a large proportion
of the budget of the health service, faced with healthcare producing health relatively flat-
of-the-curve with respect to expenditure at the margin. The use of a benchmark threshold
in such a first-best world (see Section 1.1) is held to be a simplification of a mathematical
programming problem which in its full form would rely on information that is not available
to decision-makers, and require impractical constant funding and defunding of services, with
associated costs of so doing11. Furthermore, in such situations, decision-making at the margin
does not provoke concerns regarding horizontal equity. In cases where both incremental health
gain and incremental costs are positive, the comparison of a constant threshold with a constant
aEquivalently, a net benefit rule10 can be used. Without loss of generality, this paper will discuss decision-making
solely using the method of ICER/threshold comparison
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ICER means that a treatment is either provided (where ICER < λ) or not provided (where
ICER > λ) in its entirety for all patients with equal capacity to benefit from treatment.
Given the likely diminishing marginal effectiveness of spending on healthcare in improving
health and associated non-linearity of the relationship between healthcare expenditure and
health outcomes, larger budgetary impacts are likely to imply larger health losses per pound
spent on healthcare2,7,12–14. Empirical estimation of this relationship has suggested that the
use of a constant threshold at the margin of the health system’s expenditure is likely to lead to
substantial forgone population health where the total budgetary impact is large. With regard to
decision-making by NICE for the English NHS, the marginal threshold of £12,936 empirically
estimated by Claxton et al. 15 was deemed to be around 7% too high in the case of a new
treatment with a budgetary impact of £2.5bn6, b.
Where the budgetary impact is greater, partial (but not full) acceptance may prove cost-
effective, due to the non-linearity of the relationship between expenditure and health outcomes.
Previously, such issues have appeared to be, or been held to be, irrelevant for two reasons.
First, in the absence of an estimate of this relationship beyond, but close to, the margin,
partial acceptance can be justified only with resort to a full mathematical programming model.
However, in the light of recent empirical estimation of such a relationship, a reduced form model
which takes account of this non-linearity is now possible without the need to resort to a full
mathematical programming solution. A second objection has been that the partial funding of
services is held to contravene principles of horizontal equity, where individuals in equal need
(with equal capacity to benefit) should be given equal healthcare treatment11. This paper argues
that the claim that partial provision would impose a unique contravention of the principle of
horizontal equity is inaccurate, and furthermore that any apparent such problem is potentially
obviated when the price of treatment is endogenous rather than assumed to be exogenously
given.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a four-quadrant graphical framework
that proposes a reduced form account of decision-making when such situations arise, without
resorting to a full mathematical programming solution. Section 3 discusses an allocation problem
within the framework of the model, treating the ICER as exogenous. Section 4 considers the
bNote that this marginal estimate itself is substantially lower than the threshold of around £30,000 used by
NICE in practice
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horizontal equity implications of partial provision when the ICER is treated as exogenous,
and provides a framework with which to illustrate the costs in terms of population health of
the imposition of a strict constraint enforcing horizontal equity in acceptance only. Section
5 considers how a situation where partial acceptance is optimal in a static problem might be
resolved dynamically given the optimal reactions of both the decision-maker and the manufacturer
when the ICER is treated as endogenous (arising from the price chosen by the manufacturer
given the objective function of the decision-maker) rather than exogenous. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 What does the threshold represent?
The meaning attached to the benchmark threshold requires some exposition. A comprehensive
summary of the various normative and technical interpretations attached to its value, and
the implications thereof, is provided by Culyer 13 . We initially consider a budget-constrained
healthcare system operating on its production possibility frontier (PPF), where (as detailed
in Paulden 16) any healthcare provided by the acceptance of a new treatment displaces (parts
of) existing treatment programme-populations, with the least cost-effective (parts of) existing
treatment programme-populations displaced first, thus displacing as little as health as possible
for any given level of displaced spending. In such a system, the threshold we first here consider
for marginal decision-making represents the value implied by the efficiency of the system at
the margin, representing the opportunity cost of health displaced by a new treatment with a
marginal budgetary impact or the reciprocal of the shadow price of the budget constraint (a ‘first
best’ threshold, as characterised by Culyer 13)c. While this is a particularly restrictive assumed
model and unlikely to entirely accurately characterise anything beyond an ideal type healthcare
system, it is highly useful for expositionary purposes. Many departures from these assumptions
can be incorporated within the model, and we later highlight one relaxation of this assumption
and the corresponding change in interpretation arising from it.
cThis value is commonly termed k in existing literature when referring to this specific conception of the generic
threshold λ. For consistency and clarity, we term this value λmarginal
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2 Model
Assume that a health service is able to perfectly divisibly assign healthcare inputs, with any
existing resources in use able to be reswitched to alternative purposes costlessly and immediately.
Health, provided by the health system, is a function of inputs used for treatment, with this
relationship specifying a health production function. The decision-making process faced by the
relevant authority requires the maximisation of population health, producing according to this
production function, subject to its budget constraint.
max


L∑
l=1
Jl∑
j=1
Il∑
i=1
Hijlxijl


subject to:
L∑
l=1
Jl∑
j=1
Il∑
i=1
cHijlxijl ≤ b
and
0 ≤ xijl ≤ 1, i = 1...Il j = 1...Jl, l = 1...L
where H is health produced by treatment j with cost c within programme l, for fraction x of
population i, and b is the total budget available. Given that this entails selecting the most
cost-effective treatment first, followed by the next-most cost-effective treatment and so on, this
implies a falling marginal effectiveness of treatment as the budget increases or, by the same
token, as more health is produced. The solution of such a problem in its full form requires greater
information than is available to, and greater flexibility than is practical for, the decision-making
authority and, given these constraints, decision-making generally takes the form of comparing
the ICER arising from the new intervention to a constant threshold, λmarginal.
While the functional form of a health production function (HPF), of the type specified above,
may be unknown, we can consider some general solution of this maximisation problem which
implies an indirect health production function (IHPF) of the form H = f(b, c), where c is a
vector of treatment costsd. Recent work has produced empirical estimates of the slope of such
an indirect health production function beyond the margin, taking account of its non-linearity6,
enabling decision-making to potentially go beyond such a naive assumption. Although such
empirical estimates do not recover the explicit production function drawn out above in full and
dIn line with the use of ‘indirect production function’ in the conventional theory of the firm, we use the term
‘indirect health production function’ to distinguish this, as a function of prices and a budget, from a health
production function, whose arguments are inputs explicitly.
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the optimal mix of treatments for programme-populations, the values derived by such estimation
do imply an IHPF, holding individual treatment costs constant and varying b.
Assume a new healthcare intervention is now proposed, with some large budgetary impact
m if fully implemented, for a condition which is currently not treated, with no cross-condition
associations with other existing or potential treatments and for which capacity to benefit for
potentially treatable patients is equale. This implies that any calculated ICER is based on a
comparison to no treatment, and the ICER is equal to the cost per QALY gain over no treatment.
We initially assume constant QALY returns to spending on this intervention. Health (H1) can
be produced by use of this new intervention, or (H2) by the use of existing treatments already
employed. The decision-making authority is tasked with maximising overall population health
(H1+H2), and decides upon whether to approve or reject the new intervention on this basis. The
monetary price of the new treatment, and the associated consequent ICER, is initially assumed
to be given and fixed. This implies the displacement of treatment with total expenditure of up
to m, depending on the fullness of implementation.
Consider Figure 1, a graphical illustration of this situation.
[Figure 1 here]
Quadrant I (top-right) presents the final objective function and constraint: maximising
total health (H1 + H2) subject to technological and budgetary constraints. This implies
selecting the highest possible level of health (the highest possible isohealth curve, representing
H1 +H2=constant and with slope -1) attainable from given current production technologies,
prices, and a fixed budget, b (as illustrated by the given red production possibility frontier
(PPF)). Up to H2max can be produced from existing treatment (point A), and up to H2max can
be produced from new treatment (point B). This quadrant is derived from the three remaining
quadrants.
eThis could represent either all possible patients to be treated by the new intervention or the most expensive
subgroup thereof, as per Claxton et al. 17 . While potentially each individual patient could form a separate
subgroup with a different capacity to benefit, as discussed in, inter alia Espinoza et al. 18 and Gavan et al. 19 ,
in general such levels of precision will be neither possible nor economically optimal, and it will be necessary to
use some degree of average treatment effect in estimating the ICER of a given treatment. Indeed, our earlier
cited example3 involved an intervention that had a high budgetary impact even after being recommended only in
varying doses for subgroups of patients with certain genotypes of hepatitis C, further conditional on previous
treatments received.
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Quadrant IV (bottom-right) displays how much health can be created by given amounts of
spending on the new treatment, and has a line with a slope of the negative of the ICER.
Quadrant III (bottom-left) represents the healthcare provider’s budget constraint, with the
solid section of this representing the section that could potentially be used under conditions of
full implementation of the new technology (m, assumed to be a large proportion of b).
Quadrant II (top-left) represents two versions of the IHPF, with the solid sections representing
health that is currently generated from spending b on existing treatmentf. The non-marginal
IHPF for this range of spending (black line) exhibits diminishing returns, reflecting the changes
in the cost-effectiveness of health produced by the system when moving away from the margin.
The assumed marginal IHPF (grey line), however, is linear, with a slope equal to that of the
non-marginal IHPF at its local maximum here (−1/λ). This linearity implies an assumption
that healthcare is displaced at a constant opportunity cost equal to the threshold at the margin.
Spending the full budget b on the existing treatment implies a QALY production of H2max,
consistent with position A in Quadrant I. The health assumed to be generated and lost at all
other points on this IHPF differs according to whether the pure marginal or non-marginal IHPF
is used: specifically, the pure marginal IHPF implies a lower opportunity cost in terms of QALYs
from existing treatment when additional spending is made on the new treatment, for all levels of
budgetary impact strictly greater than 0 and less than or equal to m.
3 Allocation problem
[Figure 2 here]
We now consider an allocation problem in which: 1) full implementation of the new inter-
vention would reduce population health by displacing health produced in more cost-effective
ways, 2) some degree of partial implementation, if possible, would lead to a rise in population
fOur assumption that displacement of existing healthcare provided occurs in order of least health displaced (i.e.,
from least to most cost-effective) can be replaced by an assumption that displacement occurs in order of increasing
cost-effectiveness, even if this does not represent displacing strictly the least-cost-effective treatment first – as is
reported empirically by Lomas et al. 6 . This would be one version of a second-best type threshold as characterised
by Culyer 13 . In such a situation, the relationship plotted in this quadrant would cease to represent an indirect
health production function, and instead represent what might be termed a health displacement function. All
further conclusions derived in this paper remain intact, but should be reframed in this context.
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health, 3) consequently the use of our non-marginal IHPF shows a fall in population health if
fully implemented, 4) however, if compared to the assumed pure marginal threshold (consistent
with use of the pure marginal IHPF) a rise in population health appears to be the case at full
implementation. We elaborate on this in the below.
Point A in Figure 2 represents the initial position: no spending can be made on the new,
potentially high budgetary impact, treatment before its introduction. The implications of a
decision to use the threshold implied by the pure marginal or non-marginal IHPF are here
illustrated. Assume first that a decision is to be made between accepting the treatment and
spending the full amount m on its provision, implying spending b−m on existing treatment,
or remaining at A, with no change in spending – a situation equivalent to a choice involving
a potential treatment programme with perfect indivisibility. Under the assumption of pure
marginality, acceptance would entail a move from point A to point B′, consistent with an
apparently higher isohealth curve and an associated higher level of overall health, and the
acceptance of the technology on these grounds, due to an apparent increase in total health
generated. Under the more realistic assumption of non-marginality, however, this entails a move
from point A to point B, consistent with a lower isohealth curve, an associated lower level of
overall health, and the rejection of this technology on these grounds, due to a decrease in total
health generated.
More interesting cases arise when the treatment is perfectly divisible, and decisions can be
made to accept a proportion of spending. Consider the decision to reject this treatment, or
accept its full or partial provision. At any point to the right of A and the left of D (where the
PPF cuts the original isohealth line), population health is increased by the partial provision
of the new treatment. A discrete choice between rejection and acceptance up to a level just
to the left of D, for instance E, would cause the decision-maker to accept the new treatment
and displace AF QALYs, gaining a greater FE QALYs, and thus increasing population health
by FE − AF . While this would represent an increase in overall health, it also represents a
suboptimal outcome when the objective is the maximisation of total health alone.
Consider point C. As we move right from point A along the PPF towards point C, the
slope of the PPF is shallower than that of the isohealth line (-1), representing the relative
cost-effectiveness of the new treatment compared to existing treatments, and (diminishing
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marginal) increases in population health from additional spending on the new treatment. As we
move right beyond point C, the converse is true: the slope is steeper than -1, existing treatment
is relatively more cost-effective, and total health is reduced by further use of the new treatment
and concomitant displacement of health produced by existing treatments. An optimum in terms
of total health is therefore achieved at C, where the ratio of the marginal health gains of the
old and new treatments are equal to 1, the (negative of the) slope of the isohealth line. This
implies that, for decisions involving non-marginal impacts on the healthcare system’s budget,
decision-makers maximising total health should consider the partial acceptance of a new health
technology, up to the point that increasing spending on its provision ceases to produce more
health than it displaces, rather than necessarily entirely accepting or entirely rejecting the
treatment based on its total budgetary impact.
4 Implications for horizontal equity
Assuming a constant ICER for the entire population with capacity to benefit, objections to
outcome C may be made on the grounds of a contravention of the principle of horizontal equity
– that individuals with equal capacity to benefit should be treated equally, and specifically that
individuals with an equal health condition should receive equal healthcare treatmentg. On
such an account, the existence of point C is irrelevant in this situation, representing a partial
implementation of the new treatment that is ruled out on horizontal inequity grounds. However,
it is important to recognise two sources of horizontal inequity: that of partial implementation,
and that of partial displacement.
When a new healthcare intervention is approved, a fixed budget necessitates that some
other healthcare provided elsewhere in the system is displaced. This means that – unless a new
healthcare intervention displaces the entirety of one or more interventions already provided –
that partial displacement, contravening a principle of horizontal equity, will occur when any new
treatment at all is provided. The acceptance of any new treatment in its entirety, even when its
total spending forms only a small proportion of the healthcare budget, will inevitably displace a
gWe could, in principle, suggest a conception of horizontal equity that provided each individual with an equal
chance of obtaining treatment provided by, for instance, some lottery mechanism which would not be contravened
by such an allocation mechanism.
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proportion of spending on healthcare programmes elsewhere in the system. For interventions
that are divisible, limitations on the amount of provision in any given time period can arise in
displacement through the extension of waiting lists for that intervention14.
While Appleby et al. 20 remark that local NHS commissioners may place restrictions on
patient access on grounds of clinical outcome, they further note that ‘waiting list initiatives’
are also employed when displacement of existing provision occurs (see also Claxton et al. 15).
Daniels et al. 21 note that in the English NHS ‘when services are retracted, access criteria are
often not specified and patients continue to access services in the same way; for patients, the
noticeable effects of retraction are often limited to lengthening waiting times’. While not directly
examining partial displacement, Chen et al. 22 note a number of highly cost-effective conditions
in the Irish public health system that are subject to large waiting lists. While it is for law- and
policy-makers to decide whether partial provision is more unjust than partial displacement, it
must be recognised that, where found to occur, both are sources of the same type of horizontal
inequity. Further research is warranted on the existence of, and on preferences regarding, partial
displacement within publicly-funded healthcare systems, in order to inform both statutory
guidance and decisions in practice.
Further, we can illustrate the QALY costs due to such a horizontal equity constraint in
implementation as GC −AG (Figure 2), the loss of potential health gains accrued by a failure to
partially accept at the optimum. Again, it is for policy-makers to decide if this loss of population
health is a price worth paying to avoid horizontal inequity in partial implementation.
5 Implications for pharmaceutical pricing
The preceding sections have assumed the exogeneity of the price of treatment and of the
associated ICER. The decision-making process with regard to low budgetary impact technologies,
where the relevant threshold is known or can be inferred from previous decisions, provides
an incentive for the manufacturer to price at the threshold, such that no net health gain is
made from the acceptance of the treatment but all surplus is captured by the manufacturer23.
This nevertheless represents situation in which the decision-maker, with an objective function
of maximising health, and the manufacturer would be unable to effect a mutually beneficial
movement from this point of full implementation at a price consistent with ICER1.
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[Figure 3 here]
The story is somewhat different in the case of decision-making with large budgetary impacts,
where estimates of the shape of the IHPF beyond the margin can be made. Consider now
Figure 3, where full implementation does not represent an optimal outcome for a decision-maker
trying to maximise total health, but results in zero net health gain (with both A and B lying
on the same isohealth curve)h. As discussed, holding the ICER as exogenous and given, the
requirement to maximise total health would necessitate (setting aside equity concerns) the
approval of only a proportion of the total possible volume of use, treating some patients and
not others but maximising population health, again at point C. While this partial approval
would represent an optimal solution from the point of view of a decision-maker in a one-shot
game where price is treated as exogenous, it also represents a point from which there may exist
the potential for mutually-beneficial gains for both decision-maker and manufacturer. As per
Pandey et al. 24 and Paulden 25 , the likely distribution of such manufacturer reserve ICERs –
their minimum willingness to accept in order to supply – is an empirical question requiring
further research. Nevertheless, given the often low marginal cost associated with pharmaceutical
products, profit at the margin at this partial-approval point is likely to be positive in at least
some cases at a price that the decision-maker would be willing to pay for more units of the
treatment.
The existence of point C in such a case would represent a credible threat to manufacturers:
it represents an improvement in population health compared to both point A and point B. The
decision-maker can improve population health by not treating all patients with capacity to
benefit, and thus reducing manufacturer profits compared to those that can be gained, compared
to full implementation with no health loss (B). In short, point C is preferable to point B for the
decision-maker (representing a gain in terms of population health) but less preferable to point B
for the manufacturer (reducing profit by reducing quality while retaining the same price). The
non-optimality (in the sense that mutual gains between the manufacturer and decision-maker
may be possible) of point C means that a lower price of the treatment (but higher than at the
partial implementation point C) can result than that which would prevail at point B where the
hIf the manufacturer expects the relevant threshold for a given level of budgetary impact to be set at that
involving no total health loss, a profit-maximising manufacturer would, in a one-shot game, set price at this level.
We therefore adopt this as a new starting point in this section.
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programme is fully implemented and no net health gains are made. The process by which this
may occur is illustrated in Figure 3.
By drawing the implied PPFs resulting from a change in the price (change in the ICER)
of a treatment, we can consider one possible price-setting outcome. A lower price shifts the
illustrated line in quadrant IV from ICER1 to ICER2, leading to a related outward shift in the
PPF. Given that the entire patient population has a total potential benefit of H1max, the PPF is
again undefined to the right of this position. At some point, the ICER will fall to a low enough
level such that the PPF is tangent to the isohealth curve at a position H1max: i.e. at point
B∗. Between B∗ and A, it is possible to plot out a best response function (green line, top-right
quadrant) of the decision-maker to a changing ICER, giving a locus of tangencies of the PPF
with the isohealth line (including C) as this ICER varies. The manufacturer’s problem now
becomes choosing a price concomitant with a position on this best response curve such that profit
is maximisedi. At B∗ health is maximised at a level at which mutual gains for manufacturer and
decision-maker are impossible, with a higher total level of health than at C, the entire potential
patient population treated, and as a result with no horizontal equity concerns arising in the
provision of this new treatment.
Point C, held to be in contravention of a particular conception of horizontal equity, does not
form an optimal solution but nor does it necessarily form the ultimate solution, but rather it
acts as a credible threat that the decision-maker can use when the price for treatment is to be
set. If the existence of point C cannot even be considered by the decision-making body, it cannot
exist as a credible threat that may be able to force a move to a lower price (lower ICER) for
the treatment that can also result in the full population receiving treatment, with no potential
horizontal equity concerns arising in this final outcome. While manufacturer knowledge of the
decision-making process for health technology assessment with a constant threshold implied by
the IHPF at the margin leads to a situation where net health gains are driven towards zero and
iThis is a similar result to that discussed in Claxton et al. 17 (see footnote e). The ‘menu of options’ discussed
here is analogous to our price-offer curve. In Claxton et al. 17 a discrete number of subgroups gives rise to different
combinations of quantity and willingness to pay due to the different effectiveness of the same treatment within
each of these subgroups, with opportunity costs assumed to be constant. In our model, different combinations of
quantity and willingness to pay arise due to the diminishing efficiency of healthcare expenditure with respect to
health, with the effectiveness of new spending assumed to be constant across the relevant patient population.
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all surplus captured by the manufacturer, knowledge of the existence of the non-linear PPFs
(and the associated best-response functions of the decision-maker) may lead to a situation where
the price set by the manufacturer is that associated with the maximisation of total health, with
a positive net health gain over non-implementation.
6 Conclusion
The conventional approach of rejecting or accepting a new healthcare technology by comparison
of the ICER to some cost-effectiveness threshold is appropriate, as an approximation to a full
mathematical programming solution to the maximisation of total health, if the impact on the
healthcare service’s budget is marginal. Such a case generates no concerns regarding horizontal
equity in the provision of new treatments, as such treatments are either accepted or rejected in
their entirety. This paper presents a simple theoretical model illustrating the choice faced by
decision-makers in situations where the budgetary impact of an intervention is great enough to
make the non-linearity of the relevant section of the IHPF important, and where those decision
makers have knowledge of the shape of the IHPF as we move away from the margin. In such a
situation, optimal acceptance of the new intervention in a static exogenous-ICER case may be
partial rather than full. If implementation is partial rather than full, horizontal equity concerns
may appear to arise from the fact that patients with identical health conditions and equal
capacity to benefit will not receive equal treatment. It is important, however, to recognise that
such horizontal equity issues exist within the actually-existing system, and are exacerbated when
any new treatment is accepted and health provided by other existing treatments in other sectors
is displaced. Furthermore, even if the relevance of this horizontal equity constraint is accepted
in the statics, it does not necessarily exist in a price-setting game that arises from treating the
ICER as endogenous rather than exogenous. Such a price-setting process may result in an ICER
that is lower than that implied by a threshold involving no loss of health at full implementation,
and which may maximise population health while treating the entire population with capacity
to benefit.
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Figure 1: A four-quadrant model of health production
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Figure 2: An allocation problem
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Figure 3: A best response function of the decision-maker
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